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Antipiracy and Unusual Coalitions in the 
Indian Ocean Region: China’s Changing 
Role and Confidence Building with India 
Olivia GIPPNER 
Abstract: Piracy and threats from non-state actors in the Gulf of 
Aden have triggered states to cooperate in securing waterways and 
the sea lines of communication, a development that is fundamentally 
transforming the region’s maritime security environment. As a result, 
not only has this region’s strategic importance been reaffirmed, but it 
has also gained tremendous importance through the presence of sev-
eral actors, especially China and India. Since 2008, these two coun-
tries have been involved in larger global actions against piracy, which 
has led to increasing contact between their navies and more exposure 
of their capabilities. Will the broader Indian Ocean region emerge as 
an area of cooperation or competition between China and India? 
Drawing on interviews carried out with Chinese and European ex-
perts from 2012 to 2015, this article explores the reasons for and 
instruments of cooperation in antipiracy and the degree to which 
China uses antipiracy efforts as confidence-building measures.  
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Introduction 
Piracy along so-called sea lines of communication (SLOC), such as 
the Strait of Malacca, the Gulf of Guinea, and even on the Amazon 
River, has seen an unexpected revival in public consciousness since 
2000. Piracy in the Gulf of Aden, the region of focus for this paper1, 
has also become a threat to shipping and maritime security for the 
two major powers in this region, China and India. As the number of 
piracy events has declined significantly over the past few years, both 
countries – in particular China – have remained active in sending 
their navies to the region. Considering their antagonistic relationship 
in naval-security terms, this article asks the question of whether China 
considers antipiracy as a platform for confidence building vis-à-vis its 
Indian neighbour. Will the Gulf of Aden and the broader Indian 
Ocean region emerge as an area of cooperation or competition be-
tween China and India? 
After the fall of the Siad Barre government in 1991, Somalia be-
came a country without a government and is widely considered as a 
“failed state,” a “fragile state,” and assessed as economically very 
poor (The Fund for Peace 2015; Powell, Ford, and Nowrasteh 2006: 
14). The international community reacted promptly, putting a number 
of multilateral antipiracy arrangements in place since 2008 – the 
Combined Task Forces 150 and 151, EU NAVFOR’s Operation 
Atalanta, and NATO’s Operation Ocean Shield. So-called “inde-
pendent deployers” China, India, Japan, South Korea, and Russia, 
amongst others, have coordinated their navy vessels with these larger 
coalition forces. The early literature on countries’ involvement in 
antipiracy soon argued that antipiracy was going to be too expensive, 

1  I am grateful to my former colleagues Dr. Garima Mohan and Dr. May-Britt U. 
Stumbaum, the latter the head of the NFG research group “Asian Perceptions 
of the EU” at the Freie Universität Berlin, as well as to two anonymous review-
ers for their valuable comments on previous drafts of the article. The research 
for this article was supported by the Dahrendorf Forum, a joint initiative of the 
Hertie School of Governance, the London School of Economics and Political 
Science, and Stiftung Mercator. The article has benefitted from interviews with 
policymakers and representatives from business, non-governmental organisa-
tions, and academia in the European Union and China from 2012–2015. I am 
grateful to all those who helped with the preparation of this research, but since 
anonymity was promised in most cases, their help cannot be acknowledged in-
dividually. 
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and if not supported by on-land measures towards state-building in 
Somalia, would not succeed (Lunsford 2008). The unwillingness by 
Western countries to take action on land in turn has been interpreted 
as a sign of countries’ prioritisation of securing commercial interests 
(such as avoiding high oil prices) over ensuring human security in the 
region. Piracy peaked in 2011, with 736 hostages and 32 ships held 
(Winsor 2015). In the following years, the antipiracy coalition (along 
with increased private security on cargo ships) was successful and 
Somali piracy has declined in absolute terms. A survey of imprisoned 
pirates carried out by Oceans Beyond Piracy found the presence of 
international navies to be the main deterrent, followed by armed 
guards aboard vessels (Oceans Beyond Piracy 2015a). According to 
EU NAVFOR, as of July 2015 no vessels and 26 hostages were held 
by pirates in the region (European External Action Service 2015). A 
2014 report by Oceans Beyond Piracy estimated the total economic 
cost of Somali piracy at USD 2.3 billion in 2014, down from USD 3.2 
billion in 2013 and USD 6 billion in 2012 (Oceans Beyond Piracy 
2014: 1). 
The heightened cooperation together with increasing involve-
ment of private security providers by ship owners after 2011 can be 
evaluated as successful. The increasing numbers of countries partici-
pating, in addition to the unabated contributions by the present de-
ployers, suggest a “bandwagon effect” of international cooperation 
(Anonymous 1 2015). There are two main puzzles raised by this ef-
fect. As mentioned above, there has been agreement among academ-
ics and some of the main players, such as the European Union, on 
the need for a more sustainable strategy against piracy, a so-called 
“comprehensive approach” which would include on-land operations, 
peacekeeping, and development cooperation (Neslen 2014). Provid-
ing prospects of stability and job opportunities for the young men 
who currently turn to piracy as a source of income, the logic goes, 
will remove the attractiveness of pirate attacks on international cargo 
ships. And yet, most countries focus on the seaborne escorts of trade 
vessels through the Gulf of Aden. So the first puzzle to figure out is 
why a large coalition of countries has collaborated on antipiracy re-
gardless of the awareness that Somalia is a failed state. That question 
is especially relevant in the cases of the emerging great powers, China 
and India. The second puzzle is why there has been an uptick in anti-
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piracy missions and participation since mid-2012 despite the signifi-
cant, absolute reduction of piracy since then.  
These two empirical puzzles lead us to a more theoretical debate 
on countries’ participation and cooperation in antipiracy. While the 
official discourse legitimising antipiracy around 2008/2009 was built 
around securitisation (human security, commercial interests, terror-
ism), after the successful reduction of piracy from 2012 to 2015, other 
motivators for China and India could have been prestige and image 
creation, “recognition games,” acting as a responsible stakeholder and 
norm entrepreneur, and public diplomacy. Another motivator is the 
importance of establishing a strategic presence in this critical part of 
the world. Furthermore, there are several stakeholders who even gain 
from piracy: navies, because it helps demonstrate their utility and 
justify their budget; private security companies; the media, because 
piracy makes for a good story; and for the Chinese people it provides 
“reassurance that their government is cognizant and capable with 
regard to protecting Chinese human and economic interests outside 
the Middle Kingdom” (Erickson and Strange 2015: 2).  
What is the effect of this changed motivation from the perspec-
tive of two emerging, often antagonistic powers, China and India? 
Situated in the discourse on great power relations and non-traditional 
security, this paper asks the question: Will the Gulf of Aden emerge 
as an area of cooperation or competition between China and India?  
Drawing on interviews carried out with Chinese and European 
experts from 2012 to 2015, the article explores the reasons for and 
instruments of cooperation in the field of antipiracy, along with the 
degree to which China uses antipiracy as a confidence-building meas-
ure. The article critically assesses the changing nature of and increas-
ing coordination on antipiracy globally, focusing particularly on the 
Chinese perspective. It then tests Chinese participation in antipiracy 
efforts corresponding to three steps of securitisation identified in the 
following section. Special attention is paid to the instrumentalisation 
of antipiracy efforts as a confidence-building measure whose purpose 
goes beyond securing waterways. By looking specifically at the mech-
anisms and factors that could impact and explain intense Chinese 
participation in antipiracy, the article aims to provide a new narrative 
on why countries participate in international antipiracy activities. This 
might be particularly relevant in the context of rising tensions over 
the “Belt and Road” initiative. In this way, the article’s findings may 
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be extended beyond the Horn of Africa to include maritime security 
in adjacent parts of the Indian Ocean. 
The Three Steps of Securitisation 
The literature on antipiracy has applied several concepts to explain 
why countries participate in international coalitions to combat piracy:  
 traditional security/regional strategic interests;  
 idealism, public diplomacy, self-image as responsible stakehold-
ers; 
 postcolonialism, norm entrepreneurship (for example, by China 
and Japan); and 
 securitisation.  
Given this multitude of approaches to antipiracy, the following sec-
tions will need to address the theoretical question of what antipiracy 
is an instance of – whether it is a mere international issue; a non-
traditional security issue; a confidence-building measure; a low-risk, 
high-visibility issue; or an avenue to assert power. While these ap-
proaches do not all directly answer the same question of why coun-
tries participate in antipiracy, they each provide a prism through 
which to view the interplay between domestic considerations and 
international security cooperation. 
The first segment of the literature relates to traditional security 
and regional strategic interests. This explanation sees antipiracy ef-
forts first and foremost as a consequence of instability within Somali 
territory and a continuing spiral of state failure. Pirates’ linkages with 
terrorist groups such as Al-Shabaab have been established. Paradoxi-
cally, however, the overall reduction of pirate activities, while the 
situation in Somalia remains dire (unemployment rates of 80 per 
cent), has been argued to drive former, now “unemployed” pirates to 
join terrorist organisations (Winsor 2015). However, while Somalia 
has been considered stateless and a “failed state” since the early 
1990s, the threat of piracy really only increased from 2009 onwards 
(Hunter 2008; Tsvetkova 2009). Thus, this line of argumentation does 
not explain the intensified international presence to combat antipiracy 
in the Gulf of Aden. 
The second set of explanations in the literature relates to idealist 
theories focusing on the cooperation aspect of international missions. 
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Countries aspiring to be responsible stakeholders see it as part of 
their public diplomacy strategy to carry out high-visibility missions 
against the pirate as the “common enemy of all,” a term which goes 
back to one of the first conferences on piracy in Nyon in 1937 (Rein-
sch 2014: 78; Heller-Roazen 2009). As Reinsch argues, the pirate 
seems to aim his violence at all states, making piracy a truly interna-
tional issue, even bringing countries such as the United States, Russia, 
and Iran to the same table (Reinsch 2014: 79). At the same time, pi-
rates are considered to be exclusively profit-driven, and concepts 
from international relations such as national interest and ideology are 
typically not considered, making the phenomenon “convincingly 
unpolitical” (Reinsch 2014: 79). Thus antipiracy can be seen as fo-
cused on public diplomacy and “image building to both a domestic 
and international audience” (Lin-Greenberg 2010: 217). 
Third, an emerging literature sees undertaking antipiracy meas-
ures as an avenue to act as norm entrepreneurs. Black and Hwang, 
for instance, situate themselves among culturalist and postcolonial 
perspectives, which see the “state’s self-identification [as informing] 
its foreign policy practice” (Black and Hwang 2012: 445). Chinese 
and Japanese involvement in antipiracy activities in the Gulf of Aden 
is considered an example of these countries’ intention to transform 
“the dominant norms in international society” (Black and Hwang 
2012: 431). Japan holds up as a model its Coast Guard, a civilian mar-
itime police and rescue organisation, reflecting Japan’s view of itself 
as a mediator between East and West.  
Fourth, antipiracy can be looked at through the lens of securiti-
sation. The protection of the United Nations World Food Pro-
gramme ships – humanitarian motivations – led to the creation of the 
European Union’s antipiracy mission. “Securitising” diplomatic and 
economic interests that are negatively affected by lost cargo and in-
creasing insurance premiums would mean that countries use military 
and foreign policy resources and instruments to protect these inter-
ests (King 2008). Furthermore, economic, trade, human and envir-
onmental security, and many other considerations are included in 
national security strategies and all of them have been employed to 
justify participation in antipiracy efforts. 
I have separated the process by which China has developed anti-
piracy strategies and begun to undertake antipiracy measures into 
three analytical steps: securitisation of the issue, localisation of an 
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international practice, and instrumentalisation in great power politics. 
Steps 1 and 2 will be presented only briefly, since they have already 
been covered in the existing body of literature on Chinese antipiracy 
efforts. To illustrate the concept of instrumentalisation of an interna-
tional practice for great power relations, China–India relations will be 
used as a test case. 
Step 1: Securitisation and the Rise of Global Powers 
Securitisation of global threats that are not immediately security-
related, including so-called “non-traditional” challenges, is a phenom-
enon that has been analysed in detail over the past 20 years, with the 
Copenhagen School being dedicated to understanding and extracting 
the mechanisms and reasons for securitisation. Concurrent with the 
international trend, China has also been getting more active in non-
traditional security (NTS), encompassing areas such as counterterror-
ism, cyber warfare, financial turmoil, and climate change (Buzan, 
Waever, and de Wilde 1998; Watson 2009). In the domestic academic 
debate, the SARS epidemic of 2003 reoriented much government and 
research focus towards the new area of NTS studies. In this context, 
China, through not only diplomatic actions but also increased in-
vestment into and attention directed towards theoretical and policy 
research, has become more involved on the global stage.  
Singapore-based Li Mingjiang predicts that  
China will become more proactive in its multilateral diplomacy, in 
many cases selectively, and increase its influence in global multi-
lateral settings, [but] various concerns and constraints will make it 
unlikely for China to completely overhaul or even dramatically re-
shape the multilateral architecture at the global level. (Li 2011: 9) 
Therefore, while many would agree that there has been a steady in-
crease in multilateral engagement, some claim that this has taken 
place on a rather issue-based level and case-by-case basis, making 
China a “selective multilateralist” (Kastner, Pearson, and Rector 2010; 
Shambaugh 2013). 
The new Chinese security concept of 1996 acted as a “catalyst 
for the domestic debate on NTS,” in particular as it countered the 
China threat theory (Morton 2011). Furthermore, the emphasis on 
“new historic missions” and military operations other than war 
(MOOTW) by Hu Jintao in his December 2004 speech saw antipiracy 
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overseas as one of its core components (Kamphausen 2013: 3). Thus 
antipiracy had emerged as a securitised issue in China even before the 
international coalition began coordinating its efforts in 2008. 
Step 2: Localising International Practice 
An increasing body of literature is looking exactly at questions of 
localisation and “norm entrepreneurship,” influencing the way inter-
national relations are carried out (Black and Hwang 2012: 437). On 
non-traditional security, this level of analysis traces how a shared 
complex challenge is justified and included in mainstream strategic 
culture.  
Localisation is conceived as a long-term and evolutionary assimila-
tion of foreign ideas, while some forms of adaptation in the ra-
tionalist international relations literature are seen as [a] “short-run 
policy of accommodation” [Hopf 1998]. Thus, while adaptation 
may be tactical and to some extent forced on the target audience, 
localisation is voluntary and the resulting change likely to be more 
enduring. (Acharya 2004) 
With increasing participation in antipiracy missions, the People’s 
Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) has begun localising international 
practices in its coordination efforts – for instance, through increasing 
port calls and antipiracy drills. In more concrete terms, Black and 
Hwang relate Chinese participation in antipiracy missions to its “self-
image as a responsible and benevolent Great Power that derives from 
the Chinese conception of Tianxia” (Black and Hwang 2012: 431). 
Step 3: Collective Action as an Instrument of Great 
Power Relations 
Beyond the decision to address a non-traditional security challenge, 
governments and scholars also view multilateral platforms or ad hoc 
collaborations as creating networks of interdependence. Without 
going into the theoretical foundations for collective action towards a 
public good (for example, Ostrom 2014), according to psychological 
and interpersonal theories by Kelley and Thibaut, closeness of rela-
tionships in itself can be a goal of cooperation (Kelley and Thibaut 
1978). In the European literature on the Cold War, the concept of 
adversaries taking mutual confidence-building measures corresponds 
to this logic. While, traditionally, confidence is seen as a precondition 
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for collective action, the early history of countries’ participation in 
antipiracy suggests the opposite sequence. Collective action on a low-
risk issue, such as antipiracy, thus becomes a platform for confidence 
building in great power relations. 
What makes China’s accelerating involvement in antipiracy ever 
more salient for research is its coinciding with the country’s econom-
ic “rise” and its prospects of becoming a “great power” (Kastner, 
Pearson, and Rector 2010). The term “great power” has yet to be 
defined in a consistent manner. A most general definition encom-
passes economic and political power that allows a state to exert influ-
ence on a global scale (Waltz 1993). Theorist John Mearsheimer de-
veloped an entire theory of international relations based on the idea 
of “Great Powers,” subsequently publishing The Tragedy of Great Power 
Politics. Somewhat paradoxically, he is one of the key proponents of 
the “China threat” camp of US analysts (Mearsheimer 2001). The 
negative connotation of the term, however, is far from widespread 
throughout Chinese academic and policy circles. While there is an 
ongoing conceptual debate, there are significant differences of opin-
ion on whether China can already be seen as a great power and even 
whether it actually stands a realistic chance at getting there, consider-
ing rising domestic pressures (Itzkowitz-Shifrinson 2009: 2). Kastner, 
Pearsson, and Rector have already started looking at how “multilat-
eral regimes adapt to rising powers” (2010: 2). Part of this analysis 
will contribute to the question of whether China as a rising power can 
in fact be analysed on the basis of universal theories on multilateral 
cooperation, whether it has to be treated as a “sui generis” case, or 
whether, indeed, its emergence during an era dominated by paradigms 
of cooperation will have the world witness a new kind of great power, 
socialised in unprecedented levels of global interdependence.  
While the foremost motivation for antipiracy efforts remains the 
security of trade routes (approximately 1,500 Chinese merchant ves-
sels pass through the Gulf of Aden annually, Lessons from Piracy 
2016), increasing attention has been given to other strategic implica-
tions of cooperation on antipiracy, such as image building, training 
and testing of naval resources, and international burden sharing (Hi-
rono and Neill 2012: 16). Collective action on a low-risk issue such as 
antipiracy thus could become an instrument of confidence building in 
great power relations. 
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Methodology 
In order to address these questions, the article builds on an extensive 
literature review, document analysis of speeches, reports, and other 
first-hand sources, and interviews carried out in Beijing and Brussels 
from 2012 to 2015 with members of academia, representatives from 
government think tanks, and participants in international peacekeep-
ing missions and antipiracy operations.  
Interview partners were first asked a set of questions designed to 
investigate the unilateral motivation for participating in antipiracy:  
 What principles is participation based on (economic, security, 
international, competition)?;  
 What is the domestic perception by the public and decision-
makers?  
 Has actual participation led to an adjustment and principles guid-
ing international cooperation?  
The second set of questions was focused on the role of antipiracy as a 
confidence-building measure, specifically in the Chinese–Indian con-
text:  
 To what extent do China and India actually interact?  
 Is antipiracy considered a trust-building measure?  
 How do China and India perceive each other’s participation?  
 Are there any observable implications for changing relations 
because of antipiracy coordination? 
 How does international socialisation impact their bilateral rela-
tions? 
China–India relations serve as a “typical case” (Seawright and Gerring 
2008: 297), since there is pre-existing tension and both countries take 
part in antipiracy efforts. India and China went to a short war with 
each other in 1962, and even today border disputes, rather than flour-
ishing two-way trade, dominate the relationship. India justifies much 
of its arms purchases with a need to be prepared for Chinese military 
power and what it perceives to be a China–Pakistan axis, or: the “dual 
challenge of Pakistan and China” (Sharma 2014). The String of Pearls 
theory, suspecting naval encirclement by China as well as Chinese 
investments in a blue-water navy represents a source of irritation and 
reason for caution among the Indian public as well as in elite circles 
(Atal 2013). Of the countries participating in antipiracy efforts, India 
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is the one with the strongest threat perception of Chinese naval pres-
ence. 
The article thus provides an up-to-date account drawing on in-
sights and the “success of antipiracy” in the 2010s. Taking China–
India rapprochement as an example, it qualifies the confidence-build-
ing potential of antipiracy measures. The article develops these hy-
potheses and tests them on the China–India case study. Future stud-
ies will have to systematise the findings and test their external validity 
for other multilateral and bilateral relations. The article concludes by 
identifying dynamics of cooperation and competition between China 
and India within the framework of their participation in antipiracy 
operations.  
Protecting Sea Trade, Universal Agreement on 
the “Somali Pirate Enemy,” and Chinese
Participation
Piracy in the Gulf of Aden has triggered countries to cooperate in 
securing waterways and the SLOCs. For seven years, China and India 
have been involved in the effort, which is loosely characterised by 
three multilateral task forces colloquially known as the “Three Forces”: 
the US CMF’s Combined Task Forces (CTF) 150 and 151, the EU’s 
Operation Atalanta, and NATO’s Operation Ocean Shield (see Table 
1). China and India are independent employers, yet coordinate along-
side these task forces. Within this “coalition of the willing,” the actors 
China, India, the United States, and the European Union view mari-
time cooperation as crucially important.  
Table 1. International Antipiracy Coalitions in the Gulf of Aden 
Antipiracy initiative Start date Under the coordination of  
Combined Maritime 
Forces (CMF) 
12 January 2009 multinational force, UNSC 
mandate 
Operation Ocean Shield 17 August 2009 NATO, rotating leadership 
(since October 2015: Turkey) 
EU NAVFOR Atalanta December 2008 European Union 
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According to article 101 of 1982 UN Convention on the Law of the 
Sea, acts of piracy include 
any illegal acts of violence or detention, or any act of depredation, 
committed for private ends by the crew or the passengers of a pri-
vate ship or a private aircraft […] on the high seas, against another 
ship or aircraft, or against persons or property on board such ship 
or aircraft […] in a place outside the jurisdiction of any State. (UN 
Convention on The Law of the Sea 1982: Article 1)  
China considers piracy to be a non-traditional security threat, as op-
posed to its traditional threats from the United States, Japan, and 
India (Craig 2015: 19).  
Motivations for countries to take part in antipiracy missions are 
often very pragmatic: for instance, interest in training their own na-
vies and being exposed to and learning about others’ navy systems 
(Erickson and Strange 2014: 191). From 2008 to 2015, the PLAN 
deployed personnel totalling nearly 16,000 on 68 ships (including 
destroyers and comprehensive supply ships) with 28 helicopters in 18 
task forces, escorting approximately 6,000 individual ships and 800 
groups (Erickson and Strange 2015: 81; Chen 2013; Zhao 2012). In 
January 2016 China deployed its 22nd escort task force. While naval 
exposure is a particular interest for countries such as China, which 
declared as goals the development of a blue-water navy and the “pro-
tection of the open seas” (Ministry of National Defense PRC 2015), 
other countries, such as Luxembourg and Lithuania, can be under-
stood to participate for similar reasons (Anonymous 1 2015). 
Well over six years of Chinese anti-piracy operations in the Gulf 
of Aden have directly supported People’s Liberation Army Navy 
(PLAN) modernization goals and provided invaluable experience 
operating in distant waters. Lessons learned have spawned PLAN 
innovations in doctrine, operations, and international coordina-
tion. Many of the insights gleaned during deployments are applic-
able to security objectives closer to home; some officers enjoy 
promotion to important positions after returning. Anti-piracy op-
erations have been a springboard for China to expand consider-
ably its maritime security operations, from evacuating its citizens 
from Libya and Yemen to escorting Syrian chemical weapons to 
their destruction and participating in the search for Malaysia Air-
lines Flight 370. So great are the benefits to China’s global mari-
time presence and enhanced image at home and abroad that when 
Gulf of Aden anti-piracy operations finally wind down, Beijing 
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will have to develop new means to address its burgeoning over-
seas interests. (Erickson and Strange 2015: 1) 
China, and to some extent India, had little experience with their 
growing blue-water navies; their interest in participating in man-
oeuvres has increased. China, for instance, acts very adaptively; also, 
as “a global power it will increasingly have to deal with the challenges 
of securing international waterways, while lacking the necessary ca-
pacities” (Anonymous 2 2012). Because of the novelty of this sort of 
naval cooperation, neither country takes part in the existing interna-
tional arrangements. Neither is a member of existing alliances, such as 
NATO or the European Union. Furthermore, naval control is con-
sidered an important part of both countries’ sovereignty, and cooper-
ation would also mean sharing information about one’s own capabili-
ties – sharing more than, for instance, when sending troop contin-
gents for UN peacekeeping. The PLAN’s rejection of the European 
Union’s request that they establish a bilateral framework agreement in 
January 2009 exemplifies this (Barton 2013). Despite this reluctance 
to take direct part in international arrangements, antipiracy efforts 
and the creation of mutual dependence have led to several areas of 
information sharing and informal institutionalisation between China 
and the European Union.  
Within the EU NAVFOR mission, there are interactions on op-
eration, planning, and training through the European Security and 
Defence College (Anonymous 3 2013). The EU Crisis Management 
and Planning Directorate has both military and civilian meetings with 
China, but also with India, particularly in the field of counterterror-
ism (Anonymous 4 2013). Both Chinese and European interviewees 
suggested that there is clarity on how antipiracy missions benefit Eu-
rope and China, facilitating the actual cooperation on the ground 
(Anonymous 4 2013; Anonymous 5 2012), though a French diplomat 
pointed out that the strategic consequences differ drastically: while 
the Chinese focus on escorting ships, the Europeans “actually fight 
and prosecute” pirates (Anonymous 6 2012). During the operations, 
China agreed to use the European Union’s information system Mer-
cury, rejecting the CENTRIXS, the US-operated alternative.  
Antipiracy as a platform for bilateral naval interaction even 
transcends the EU connection, as China, for instance, even carried 
out a joint antipiracy drill with the United States on 17 September 
2012 (USS Winston S. Churchill Public Affairs 2012). Similarly, China 
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requested the EU take part in a similar joint drill, which eventually 
took place on 14 July 2014, marking the first time the EU – as a re-
gional actor – conducted a naval drill with a third country (People’s 
Daily 2014). On 1 October 2013 China and India participated in a 
multilateral drill focusing on antipiracy and illegal immigration (Ray 
2013). Thus, through regular coordination, ship-to-ship exchanges, 
combined exercises, and port visits, “Beijing has greatly expanded its 
naval diplomacy in the name of anti-piracy” (Erickson and Strange 
2015: 6). Table 2 summarises these contact points between the task 
forces and the independent deployers as presented in the 2013 White 
Paper on the Chinese Armed Forces. 
Table 2. Chinese Coordination with International Antipiracy Providers 
 joint escorts with Russian counterparts 
 joint antipiracy drills with naval ships from the Republic of Korea (ROK), 
Pakistan, United States 
 coordinated with the European Union to protect World Food Programme 
ships 
 exchanged boarding visits of commanders with task forces from the EU, 
NATO, Combined Maritime Forces, ROK, Japan, Singapore 
 active participation in Contact Group on Piracy off the Coast of Somalia 
(CGPCS) and Shared Awareness and Deconfliction (SHADE) meetings 
 since 2012, China, India, and Japan have been conveying coordination, 
adjusting escort schedules, optimising available assets; ROK joined at the 
end of 2012 
Source: Information Office of the State Council 2013. 
The SHADE mechanism, however, seems to ameliorate the PLAN’s 
sovereignty sensitivities by focusing on facilitating tactical coordina-
tion:  
a voluntary and horizontal command and control structure, where 
participants would not follow orders but simply coordinate their 
naval forces and, where possible, share best practice. (Barton 
2013) 
Antipiracy as a Means of Confidence Building 
The idea behind confidence-building measures is that more interac-
tion, during which countries expose some of their naval capabilities in 
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a cooperative manner, will serve transparency and thus foster trust 
and confidence between two adversaries. There are several ways in 
which navies interact vis-à-vis antipiracy: first, on a very tactical level, 
they engage in ship-to-ship cooperation and, second, they coordinate 
on strategy and policy at the mission headquarters or in the capitals 
of the contributing countries. China interacts with other navies in 
several ways. First, through antipiracy drills, such as between EU 
NAVFOR and the Chinese PLAN (Ministry of National Defense 
PRC 2014). Besides being good practice in simple tactical aspects, 
these drills facilitate a very basic political framework for future drills 
between the two maritime actors. Furthermore, China’s escorting of 
ships, especially those from the World Food Programme, meant re-
sources were able to be freed up by the main multilateral missions. 
Finally, any involvement of China with other countries is driven by its 
goals of achieving visibility globally and reinforcing a public image 
domestically of being a global actor (Anonymous 7 2015). 
The various multilateral task forces provide platforms for poten-
tial interaction and diffusion. In fact, antipiracy was one of the most 
frequently named non-traditional security areas when interviewees 
were asked in preparation for this research about any potential diffu-
sion of practices from the European Union to China and India. The 
respondents saw potential on two levels: in socialising Indian and 
Chinese navies into a certain way of cooperating internationally, and 
for China and India to draw lessons on a more tactical level through 
the interaction with other navies. On a broader level, the EU also 
hopes to see China and other countries engage more in effective mul-
tilateralism (see its 2003 European Security Strategy): initial signs have 
pointed in such a direction. For example, Chinese willingness to take 
part but also shape the practice of international antipiracy operations 
is representative of a more proactive commitment to multilateralism. 
According to media reporting, China began lobbying in 2009 to chair 
the current “facilitating venue” for the three task forces, called the 
Shared Awareness and Deconfliction (SHADE) programme (Erick-
son and Strange 2013). Eventually, these intentions were withdrawn. 
The SHADE mechanism is considered a key coordinating mecha-
nism to manage the multitude of actors present in the antipiracy ef-
forts – NATO, EU, independent deployers, and the maritime indus-
try. SHADE was designed to ensure the best use of assets and to 
“avoid redundancies,” while deconflicting “ongoing military counter-
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piracy operations in the Gulf of Aden and the western Indian Ocean” 
(Oceans Beyond Piracy 2015b). 
Under SHADE, the Contact Group on Piracy off the Coast of 
Somalia (CGPCS) was formed so that force-deploying actors could 
share knowledge.  
The CGPCS was set up in January 2009 to “foster closer interna-
tional cooperation to address the scourge of piracy off the coast 
of Somalia,” following the adoption of UN Security Council Reso-
lution 1851 (2008). (Tardy 2014: 7)  
The CGPCS brings together more than 80 participants, including 
states, the European Union, and the International Maritime Organisa-
tion, as well as shipping industry and seafarers’ representatives and 
non-governmental organisations (NGOs).  
According to representatives from the EU military service, both 
SHADE and the CGPCS are considered to be “smooth,” well-func-
tioning coordinating mechanisms (Anonymous 7 2015). The very 
structure, which has “none of the attributes of formal multilateral 
settings (secretariat, decision-making procedures, legal framework, 
budget, etc.)” and the fact that it is purely operational (“all navies talk 
without problem about how to avoid wasting resources”) and not 
political can be seen as one of the reasons for its success (Tardy 2014: 
7). There are no reports of a national navy defecting and not escort-
ing a vessel as agreed under SHADE coordination (Anonymous 7 
2015). 
Case Study China–India Relations 
As we have seen, there is an existing multilateral infrastructure creat-
ing interfaces between national navies involved in antipiracy, both at 
the practical and the policy level. Furthermore, the two countries 
have been working closely on combatting other non-traditional 
threats, such as terrorism. For instance, after a visit of the Indian 
Home Minister to Beijing in November 2015, the two countries is-
sued a rare joint statement pledging intensified information exchange 
regarding terrorist activities (Patranobis 2015). But what does this 
mean for countries’ bilateral relations and how could “confidence-
building” antipiracy play out in practice? As Kanti Bajpaj argues, 
there is  
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a growing view, fuelled by outsiders as well as commentators in 
China and India, that the two countries are in competition in the 
Indian Ocean region. (Bajpaj 2013; Mohan 2012)  
One of the visible areas of content is China’s launch of the ambitious 
“Belt and Road” initiative (also known as the “Silk Road Economic 
Belt and the 21st-century Maritime Silk Road,” or “One Belt, One 
Road”). Part of the project is designed to go from China’s coast to 
the Indian Ocean region. New Delhi has been highly sceptical of the 
idea, distrustful of the true intentions of this initiative. Some counter-
proposals from the Indian side have emerged, such as Project Mau-
sam (2014–2019), which is meant to “re-establish communications 
between countries in the Indian Ocean world” and to foster “under-
standing national cultures in their regional maritime milieu” (IGNCA 
2014). 
Looking at two countries that have an adversarial security rela-
tionship such as China and India, the following section will describe 
their bilateral interactions and consider whether (joint) discourses and 
actions on antipiracy have a “confidence-building” effect. Figure 1 
displays the time line of international antipiracy coalitions and Indo-
Chinese relations in that context. It demonstrates the rapprochement 
by the two sides following the establishment of SHADE – for in-
stance, through the coordination mechanism, which was established 
between China, India, and Japan in 2012. It also shows antipiracy as a 
platform for disputes – for instance, those in 2012 and 2014, which 
signify India’s increasing suspicion towards foreign naval presence in 
the Indian Ocean. 
There are several constraints of an institutional nature, affecting 
in particular Indian participation in the missions. A common problem 
cited in recent strategic writings in India regarding cooperation with 
Europe for antipiracy operations is the lack of centralised coordina-
tion. Neither EU NAVFOR Somalia carrying out Operation Atalanta 
nor NATO’s Operation Ocean Shield is deployed as a UN Peace-
keeping Force. If they were under a unified command, operations 
could function more efficiently and successfully. Ships from countries 
including China, India, and Japan thus operate independently. Efforts 
towards SHADE by the United States under its Maritime Liaison 
Office in Bahrain are deemed “naturally inadequate” (Sawhney 2010: 
137). If there were to be a unified command under the auspices of  
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Figure 1. Timeline of China–India Relations on Antipiracy in the Indian 
Ocean 

  

2008
2016 
Nov 2008: EU NAVFOR 
mission starts
2008: Creation of SHADE
9 August 2009: PLAN 
first and only friendly visit 
to Cochin, India
2011: Pirate attacks reach 
their peak
March 2012: China hosts 
counter-piracy symposium
Oct 2013: China and India 
participate in antipiracy 
drill
July 2015: No vessels in 
pirates’ control
2012: Indian–Chinese–
Japanese agreement
2012–2014: India–Italy 
dispute on high-risk area 
and Italian marines
Jan 2014: Chinese “anti-
piracy” drill garners Indian 
suspicion
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the UN peacekeeping missions, as there is for land-based peacekeep-
ing operations, India would be much readier to participate in its 
structure (Sawhney 2010; Mohan 2012). As a consequence, Indian 
participation under Atalanta has been much lower than that of China. 
India’s core interests differ from China’s (see Table 3). This is 
particularly true in relation to antipiracy in the Gulf of Aden, which 
belongs to the Indian Ocean and thus to what India perceives its own 
sphere of influence. While their interests align in principle on the fact 
that antipiracy is a rather low-risk mission, for China it also contrib-
utes to its aspiration to shift from being a land-based power to being 
a so-called “oceanic power.” In 2008, however, the increase of West-
ern and Chinese naval ships in the Indian Ocean under the banner of 
antipiracy was initially greeted with suspicion. India is more interested 
in cooperating with other countries on counterterrorism issues, which 
carry less relevance for India’s own territorial integrity. From a more 
pragmatic perspective, both countries want to protect their core trade 
routes. For China, this article claims, naval exposure through antipir-
acy can also serve as a platform for confidence building. 
Table 3. Chinese and Indian Interests in Antipiracy Coordination 
Interests, 
based on 
China India 
…principles antipiracy as a low-risk mission, 
rather than addressing the root 
causes in Somalia, as willingness to 
put Chinese soldiers at risk is low 
 
shift from land-based power to 
“oceanic power” 
antipiracy as a low-risk 
mission, preference for 
international cooperation 
on antiterrorism 
 
protection of regional 
sphere of influence in 
the Indian Ocean 
…pragmatic 
motivations 
implications for core trade route; 
naval exposure, confidence building 
in the Indian Ocean 
implications for core 
trade route 
In practice, there are several core obstacles hindering closer coopera-
tion between China and India in and through antipiracy: first, the 
interaction created through participation is more limited than it ap-
pears on paper; second, there have been international disputes on the 
effects of rising insurance premiums in waters close to the Indian 
coastline and disputes over the areas that can be controlled for antipir-
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acy; and, third, Chinese presence in the Indian Ocean in itself consti-
tutes a traditional security challenge for India.  
The multilateral mechanisms described in the previous section 
evince India and China’s only very limited interactions. China has, in 
general, been more active than India within SHADE, actively partici-
pating since its creation in 2008, while India has focused on its own 
missions (Anonymous 7 2015). The first official mention of antipira-
cy in bilateral talks between China and India took place in February 
2012, when the two agreed to undertake joint operations against pir-
ates. Steps taken have been slow, however. For instance, there would 
be benefits to also discussing antipiracy at multilateral BRICS meet-
ings, but “tensions between China and India had long been identified 
as the major obstacle to including maritime security in discussions 
during the BRICS [Brazil, Russia, India, China, South Africa] sum-
mit” (Stuenkel 2012). 
There is disagreement on the international or national jurisdic-
tion of areas affected by piracy. These tensions were expressed in the 
Italy–India case of February 2012, when two Italian sailors, who were 
members of a military security team tasked with protecting a privately 
owned cargo ship, shot at a fishing boat in a situation they mistook 
for a pirate attack (Al Jazeera 2014). The Indian courts threatened to 
prosecute the Italian nationals outside of international law and for 
murder in the Indian system. The row was characteristic of an ongo-
ing dispute of how close to the Indian coast international waters can 
be claimed and what threats there would be to India’s local fisheries 
and its jurisdiction (Press Trust of India 2012). A similar incident 
occurred in October 2013, when the Indian coast guard stopped a 
ship operated by a US maritime security company which was carrying 
an international crew and arms but which failed to produce adequate 
documentation (Chandresekaran 2014). According to a report by 
Reuters, this case highlights the “loosely regulated practice of placing 
private and military armed guards on ships for protection against 
pirate attacks” (Chandresekaran 2014). 
India views antipiracy activities in direct relation to its own mari-
time security in the Indian Ocean and such activities are perceived  
as a direct challenge to India’s commercial and strategic interests. 
Chinese companies have been building maritime and energy infra-
structure in countries such as Sri Lanka, the Maldives, and Myan-
mar to decrease their dependence on the Straits of Malacca. In In-
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dia, these actions have led to the view that China is encircling In-
dia by building commercial ports that it may develop into military 
bases in the future. (Dixit 2014)  
From 29 January to 3 February 2014, a three-ship task force from the 
PLAN conducted antipiracy, search-and-rescue, and damage-control 
exercises near Indonesia, which were observed with suspicion by 
Indian commentators (Krishnan 2014). Similarly, in 2014 Chinese 
submarines publicly docked at ports in the Indian Ocean, including 
Colombo and Karachi. The Chinese said those submarines were on 
their way to take part in the antipiracy operations and needed to use 
the ports for re-supply. But, according to Pandit, it caused serious 
concerns in India, leading many to suspect that “China is practising 
long-range deployments of its nuclear and conventional submarines 
on the pretext of anti-piracy patrols” (Pandit 2015). This observation 
is echoed by external actors, such as US representatives, who also 
questioned the “logic” behind the submarine deployments (Peri 
2016). Thus, Chinese antipiracy efforts are perceived as a cover for its 
true goal of increasing its overall naval presence in the Indian Ocean, 
which runs counter to the confidence-building hypothesis. 
However, in the case of China–India relations, such obstacles 
have not yet led to a similar confrontation. There is a history of mak-
ing mutual port calls between the two countries and, in what can be 
considered a first, in 2013 they participated in a joint naval exercise 
on antipiracy, maritime security, and illegal immigration (Ray 2013).  
Even though India and China are not on the same page on naviga-
tional rights in the South China Sea, the two navies agreed to in-
crease ship visits, conducting joint maritime search and rescue ex-
ercises and cooperat[ing] in counterpiracy operations. (Ray 2013) 
Antipiracy as an Instrument of Great Power Relations: 
Cooperation and Competition 
Having revisited the events of and the participation by China and 
India in antipiracy, I now return to the initial question of whether the 
Indian Ocean region will emerge as an area of cooperation or compe-
tition between India and China. What mechanisms could impact or 
explain the outcome? 
To partly answer the question posed by this special issue of 
whether there is more cooperation or competition between the two 
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countries: antipiracy acts as a platform for both. The 2012 agreement 
to develop a mechanism to coordinate Chinese, Indian, and Japanese 
navy ships – each of whom provides their own protection vessels – 
when escorting cargo vessels through the Gulf of Aden was a clear 
sign of cooperation (Information Office of the State Council 2013). 
Similarly, the first joint training exercise and the two countries’ par-
ticipation in the SHADE mechanism symbolised the rapprochement 
created within the multilateral setting of antipiracy. 
However, antipiracy drills and activities involving China are per-
ceived as an invasion of Indian areas of dominance; additionally, 
China’s drills and its relations with certain countries, such as Sey-
chelles, the Maldives, and Sri Lanka, are considered by many pundits 
to be signs of an encirclement (String of Pearls) strategy. Recent as-
sertiveness by China concerning its maritime security interests in the 
South China Sea and the publication of the 2013 Blue Book on the 
Indian Ocean by the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences, a govern-
ment think tank, reinforces the Indian wariness of Chinese objectives. 
The book states that  
in the past, China’s Indian Ocean strategy was based on “modera-
tion” and “maintaining the status quo,” but the changing dynam-
ics of international relations necessitates China play a more proac-
tive role in affairs of the region. (Kaplan 2013)  
Thus, while no comparable open confrontations akin to India’s pre-
vious one with the Italian marines in 2012 have taken place between 
China and India surrounding antipiracy, one cannot exclude the pos-
sibility of an emphatic reaction by India should a Chinese antipiracy 
ship be seen as interfering within Indian territorial waters. Thus the 
conclusive answer to whether antipiracy builds China’s and India’s 
mutual confidence must remain unsettled. As an Indian journalist put 
it,  
New Delhi and Beijing undoubtedly realize the potential of a co-
operative partnership on a vital issue like anti-piracy operations. 
But they are also fully aware of the limits of even this win-win situ-
ation. (Gokhale 2012) 
There are several filter factors, such as history, personal background, 
political system, and culture (Gippner and Mohan 2015) that affect 
the potential for cooperation on antipiracy. The history of colonial-
ism, cultural differences, the criticism of Western interventionist 
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structures, and developing country solidarity have created a general 
Chinese distrust towards a Western-led antipiracy alliance. The polit-
ical context and slow decision-making structures explain the hesitant 
and step-by-step approach among Chinese foreign policy elites. Al-
though China’s willingness to take part in officer training and plan-
ning might be interpreted as an openness to deepening cooperation, 
China attaches greater importance to the principle of non-interfer-
ence and the avoidance of risk. Hence, China views SHADE as a 
mere facilitating platform and rarely engages in bridge-to-bridge ex-
changes. Regardless, in line with its general neglect for India in its 
foreign policy, China is seen as a distinct actor in the area of antipiracy.  
The field of antipiracy, as it has opened up areas of cooperation 
and coordination, has done so across all participating countries, and 
has seen emerging economies close ranks with established ones in 
what can be described as a “success story of friendly relations.” The 
initial distrust of the antipiracy initiative and of EU and NATO leader-
ship can no longer be observed in the two countries’ discourses. Both 
actors take advantage of antipiracy as a means of engaging multilater-
ally and reinforcing a public image of a responsible actor, but they 
have not yet leveraged it for their bilateral relationship beyond the 
first set of joint antipiracy drills. However, the discourse is changing: 
with China getting engaged at an early stage, there is a possibility that 
India might follow a similar trajectory to China’s, albeit with a certain 
time lag. 
Conclusion 
Antipiracy has been identified as one of the areas of international 
cooperation where emerging powers such as China and India have an 
increasing interest in participation that exceeds practical, economic-
interest driven motivations. Similar to other major economies, China 
and India support the non-threatening global discourse, which de-
picts “the Somali pirate” as an undisputed “enemy of all” and “other” 
(Reinsch 2014: 69). Cooperation alongside actors such as the EU and 
even NATO, which would be unthinkable in another context, has 
suddenly become legitimised. In that way, antipiracy has moved from 
addressing a non-security issue – which, additionally, appeared ex 
ante as a costly and futile endeavour – to an area of international 
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engagement and an opportunity for confidence building between 
major countries.  
The analysis has shown that there is no definite answer to 
whether the Gulf of Aden will become an area of competition or 
cooperation for China and India. So far, antipiracy has served as a 
platform of cooperation and led to intensified contact between the 
two navies. China has wholeheartedly embraced this process, expos-
ing increasing numbers of navy staff to exercises and coordination 
mechanisms in the Gulf of Aden. India, however, continues to feel 
threatened by the Chinese presence in the region, and is fighting legal 
battles concerning the delineation of high-risk areas in its coastal 
zones to prevent foreign navies from using antipiracy to enter what it 
considers Indian waters. The opening of a Chinese refuelling point in 
Djibouti along with China’s recent claims that the presence of its 
submarines in the Indian Ocean was necessary for antipiracy purpos-
es are considered to validate this perception (Peri 2016). Hence, while 
China might consider antipiracy as a platform for increased coopera-
tion and hence confidence building, India’s perception of China’s 
motivations has not changed.  
The article also explored the hypothesis on the instrumentalisa-
tion of antipiracy cooperation for great power relations based on the 
China–India case study. It argued that antipiracy efforts – in particu-
lar in light of their overwhelming success in securing waterways in the 
Gulf of Aden – can be seen as instruments of great power relations. 
In its present form and geopolitical context, antipiracy cooperation 
exhibits at a strategic and a tactical level elements of both competi-
tion and cooperation.  
This ambiguity could be explained by the fact that the relations 
between these two emerging great powers, India and China, are con-
stantly evolving, with neither of them having reached a status quo 
position. Antipiracy might be special, because it is at the interface 
between traditional and non-traditional security relations. While Chi-
nese and Indian cooperation is slowly moving forward in the context 
of BRICS – for example, with the creation of the BRICS Develop-
ment Bank (now known as the New Development Bank) in July 2015 – 
regular border disputes and an increasing Chinese presence in the 
Indian Ocean through submarine port visits to Sri Lanka and Pakis-
tan reinforce India’s threat perceptions.  
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A potential way towards increasing interaction between the two 
countries in the Indian Ocean might even lie in including antipiracy 
as an area of common interest in other multilateral fora. China and 
India have held maritime dialogues since 2014 to exchange views on 
maritime concerns and cooperation. Aside from that, they both par-
ticipate in two regional associations: China is a dialogue partner of the 
Indian Ocean Rim Association (IORA), while India is a full member; 
in addition, China is an observer seeking full membership in the 
South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC), of 
which India is a founding member.  
Future research would have to further verify these findings by ana-
lysing the discourse on antipiracy in both countries and the perceptions 
communicated in official documents of each other’s participation. As 
the issue of antipiracy is still evolving and international cooperation will 
likely be considered along the “seven piracy chokepoints,” we can ex-
pect both countries to take stronger coordinating roles using platforms 
like this and the Malacca Straits Patrols network (Maritime Insight 
News Network 2016). The positive mode of interaction between the 
EU, NATO, and independent force deployers China and India in the 
Gulf of Aden might thus serve as a template for cooperation.  
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